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only a rise in the tensions that provoke conflict, but an undermining of the social-control mechanisms for channeling them. The perception of these changes by the members of the society makes for shifts in the individual calculi, grossly measured in changes in the rate of behavior. In order to understand the interrelated problems of the sources of the increasing tensions and the reasons homicide is chosen as a means of resolving them, I have reconstructed the course of social change in the period from 1935 to 1965.

Increasing Social Tensions

New economic enterprises have increased wealth differences in the community. The best measure of this is in the increase in cattle-holding, which is a socially approved way of spending money. Twenty-five years ago, there were only a half-dozen men with cattle, and they had only one or two head each. Today, one of the herders in the community has 200 head of cattle, and 75 percent of the households have one or more each.

Cattle-herding is a "new" industry in the sense that instead of just having a team of oxen to help with agricultural labor, men are breeding cattle for profit. Because the cattle roam freely, there is much loss, and this leads to accusations of theft. I have never heard such accusations directed against anyone outside the community; crime as well as positive moral relationships is confined within the boundaries of this corporate community. Suspected cattle thieves are killed by the cattle-owner or by a killer hired by the cooperative of cattle-owners. Such killings account for six of the 37 cases analyzed above (Table 1).

The illicit distilling of liquor has also added to the town's prosperity. The liquor industry was introduced about 15 years ago, but the number of distillers has increased from 5 to 40 in the last five years. From an enterprise formerly meeting only local market needs, contraband liquor is now sold as far away as the coastal area and across the border in Guatemala. A cooperative of distillers has reduced the frictions that immediately followed the introduction of liquor-distilling. The cooperative pays the fines of any member caught distilling, and in addition threatens to use group action against informers, who were formerly tempted to earn the 200 pesos offered by federal agents. But the envy aroused by the sight of those who profit from this enterprise,

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as with the cattle industry, is a covert cause for personal attacks on other grounds.

A third enterprise, trucking, has caused a realignment of political interests in factions associated with two truck-owning cooperatives. Membership in one of the cooperatives, or patronage of one of the two trucks, arouses the enmity of members of the other cooperative. Several threats have been made on the lives of the owners and the operators, but the only damage done has been to tires.

The tensions resulting from the introduction of these new enterprises cannot be fully measured by the deaths attributed to direct economic conflict. Wealth differences resulting from the new enterprises excite envy, and with it come accusations of witchcraft. In this community, witchcraft killing does not perform the normative function of reducing wealth differentiation that Kluckhohn saw operating among the Navaho (1944), since it is the poor man who is killed as a witch, not the rich man. The slaying of the envious witch exacerbates the economic differentiation that provides the seedbed for conflict.

Another new source of tension is found in the growing demand for political leadership or even independence from the township by the *ejido* colonies formed since land reform went into effect in 1937. The inept maneuvers of two founders of the ejido colonies in hot country resulted in two homicides (cases 12 and 18 in Table 1).[8] The increasing strength of these hamlets will mean that more attempts will be made in the future to gain political equality and/or independence. Whether this will result in increasing homicides will depend on social-control agencies external to the Indian communities.

Homicide occurring as a direct result of economic and political competition represents a new strategy in the community. The decision to kill rather than to use other negative sanctions is related to the social-control mechanisms discussed below.

Changing Mechanisms of Social Control

A system of social control rests not only on the exercise of negative sanctions, but on the sense of personal security derived from confidence in the institutions of control. In Teklum, the maintenance of control was formerly centered in the guardianship against malevolent spirits held by the ancestor spirits and the curers. The "police force," made up of ten

291 184 a typical outfit with special characteristics. For instance, the men of Tenejapa wear a hat of broad brim and pointed round crown, trimmed with thin ribbons of different colors. They also wear a dark chamarra or poncho with thin white stripes. The characteristic clothes of Cancuc are short, tight pants and a long shirt trimmed with red wool yarn. In Tierra Caliente the wool chamarra is not used nor is the variation in outfit so well defined.

Transportation

482 [484] [487] [492] Men and pack animals are the principal carriers in the Tzeltal region, which is crossed in all directions by narrow trails. Men carrying loads of 40–50 kg. usually 482 147 walk, in one day, as far as 8 leguas (leagues). According to Blom and LaFarge (1926–27, 2:386), the Tzeltal of the highlands are so strong "que ponen en vergüenza a una mula." In 1944 I observed Indians [565] passing by my Yochib camp, carrying chairs on their shoulders, in which a lady or a child of upper-class Ladinos from Ocosingo 492 and Yajalon would be sitting. Pack animals are now becoming common among the Tzeltal, some of whom also have saddle horses.

491 Part of the Tzeltal-Tzotzil region is crossed by the Pan-American Highway joining Guatemala and Mexico City. In recent years, roads called "brechas de penetración" for motor vehicles are being constructed. 474 493 The natives of some communities (Oxchuc and Chanal) have organized cooperatives and purchased their own trucks.

804 *Units of Measure*

The system of measures still retains aboriginal characteristics. The main units are:

Nab: Distance between the end of the thumb and the middle finger extended.

Chutub: Distance between the end of the thumb and the index finger extended. It is equivalent to the jeme. The Indians do not use the cuarta (distance between the thumb and little finger extended).

[P 208-B]

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Ladino butchers in the neighboring town. The cows are not milked either for local consumption or sale. Fertilizers are for the most part wasted since the cattle roam freely in the communal pasture lands except in the case of a few corrals owned by families. Hides are cured rather crudely and are used for saddle packs or protective aprons by the men, but none are sold.

The cooperatives. The notion of a cooperative to mobilize capital had been introduced by the I.N.I. in 1957 with the inauguration of a store owned by over one hundred members of the community. In the first years of its existence, the cooperative had some difficulties, primarily in convincing the Indians that when the returns on shares were lower in any year from prior levels, it did not indicate that the agents were stealing the money.

The cooperative store was bought by the Indians of the town from the I.N.I. in 1964 after the members had some trouble receiving returns on their shares. There are now one hundred and twenty-two members. The profits of 1965 were reinvested in the purchase of the corn-grinding mill. Current profits at the store are lent at 5 percent per month interest. The store grosses 80 to 100 pesos in sales daily, and the mill grossess 100 pesos. The wages paid to the storekeeper are 300 pesos and to the miller 250 per month.

Now that the cooperative is independent of the government, one of the stated policies is not to sell a single share to a Ladino or member of another community. "We do not want to give gifts to the Ladinos," the secretary of the cooperative told me. He added, "There was a Ladino in Teopisca who wanted to join with 5,000 pesos, but we wouldn't let him in. If you let them in, they would come to dominate the pueblo." The cooperative store does not share profits with the consumers but gives dividends. The 11,380-peso assets in the year 1965 were reinvested in stock and in the purchase of corn at harvest which was then sold at one and a half or two times the sale price.

The Indians developed their first independent cooperative in the ownership of a *marimba,* a musical instrument like a xylophone, operated by eight men of the community. This enterprise failed because the players never developed sufficient skill to be commissioned to play outside of town.

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000 town. However, other cooperatives have been successfully organized to
474 finance small-scale oeprations. Five record players with loudspeakers have
275 been installed in the houses of members who sell liquor. Once the initial
216 investment is made, the operating costs are low: 27 pesos for electricity, 25
454 pesos for a liquor license, 30 pesos for *haciendа* or state tax, and 10 pesos
434 for the township tax. Liquor bought at 60 pesos for an 18-liter jug is resold at 72 pesos. The total monthly cost of 92 pesos yields a net profit of about 300 pesos. The cost of the installation, 5,000 pesos, was low enough for some of the richer members of the community to finance individually, but as one of the operators told me, it was too risky—that is, too profitable.
474 The envy the neighbors would feel on seeing the profits made would
434 never result in witchcraft against all of the members, whereas an individ-
626 ual owner could expect that he himself or a member of his household
754 would become ill or die as the victim of witchcraft. These early entrepreneurs recognize the value of the cooperative in overcoming the force of envy which has effectively inhibited acquisition or display in these corporate Indian communities. Instead of socializing losses, one of its functions
[182] in modern capital organizations, the cooperative in Tzo'ontahal serves to socialize gains.

474 The most enterprising action of the new cooperatives has been the pur-
493 chase of a truck, initiated by the entrepreneur, Santos. The purchase of the
452 truck was inspired by the example of the Ladino secretary, who with his wife and son had a monopoly on the transportation of pottery, people, and wheat out of the village. Furthermore, in the neighboring town of Zinacantan the Indians were successfully operating two trucks. Santos went with his brother to the director of the I.N.I. in Las Casas to ask for a co-signer on the installment purchase of a Chevrolet truck, since without a Ladino sponsor Indians could not get credit with the company. According to one informant, I.N.I. officials advised them that they would not be able to profit from this venture and that they should buy a tractor with their money. The brothers persisted and went to the Dodge company in the state capital. The company agreed to sell to the Indians without Ladino co-signers on the basis of a down payment of 10,000 pesos. The initial payment was raised with thirty Indians putting up the money. Some gave no more than 150 pesos, but as the instigators of the purchase remarked, "The more members we have, the more power it gives us."

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The truck is the focus of the desire for self-improvement, for fighting the Ladino monopoly of the road, for the antagonisms and factional strife and conflict within the community. When they bought the truck, the Indians hired a Ladino in the neighboring town as chauffeur. One of the conditions of his employment was that he would teach his Indian assistant to drive. The Ladino tried to avoid doing this since he knew it would be the end of his job. But the Indian assistant learned by observation and is now operating the truck with an Indian assistant.

Accounts of the cost and profit of the truck operation indicated a running loss. A new tarpaulin cost 1,200 pesos; there were repairs and bribes to the highway patrol. But the truck was kept in operation because the major shareholders were impressed with the power it gave them. "They [their enemies, the members of the other co-operative owned by the Ladino along with twenty members of the community] are afraid of us because of the truck," one said, and added that it was better than having a *swayohel,* the animal spirit that gives power to the curers. At the time of my last visit in 1967 the truck was making a profit. The owners were thinking of selling it and replacing it with a five-ton model.

Structural realignment has been most marked in the organization of the truck-owning cooperatives. Membership cuts across the dual division for both of the truck-owning cooperatives. The cooperative is the most important factor in local political elections (Chapter 9). The truck has become both the symbol of power and the basis for the contest for power between the factions within the community.

Contraband liquor. The number of distillers has grown in the last ten years from five to forty. The distillation process was learned by Indians from Ladinos in neighboring towns fifteen years ago. There has been no local innovation in the basic process, but a new item, used in distillation, has been introduced into pottery production, a funnel decorated in the traditional manner of the water jars and other vessels. The capital investment in the equipment for operating the still is put up by individuals or partnerships of relatives. The still is rented to people who have charge of the celebration for a saint's day, or who are involved in courtship.

Private enterprise is the favored form of organization of the distillers be-

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474 The strategies the cooperative members have developed in their frequent
648 tangles with state police illustrate the combination of custom and innova-
661 tion. When caught red-handed, they may respond by playing the stereo-
type Indian role. "We don't know anything. We are just poor Indians.
How do you expect us to do what the law says?" This is hard for the La-
dino authorities to resist, since it feeds their own sense of superiority. But
it does not always work, and so the Indians have devised secondary re-
sources. They put the departmental police at each terminal of their usual
route between Las Casas and Comitán on a regular monthly mordida pay-
[693] roll of 50 pesos each. When trying to extend their operations, they hire a
lawyer. A recent coup has been the acquisition of a permit to truck corn
from Villa las Rosas and other ejido settlements that have been recently
colonized. The appeal was made on the basis that they are a nonprofit
cooperative of ejidatarios. With the permit, they now undercut the price of
their own competitors in the town as well as of the large companies. Law-
474 yers are beginning to advertise themselves in newspapers as "Friends of
693 the Indians" and are in some cases specializing in this new patronage,
which they receive from other communities as well as Tzo'ontahal. The
professional relationship bypasses personal ties which formerly limited the
development of Indian leadership.

177 The self-development occurring in Tzo'ontahal may appear paradoxical
178 if we do not understand the internal dynamics by which change is con-
474 tained within an existing equilibrium. The cooperative association has
621 been adopted as a technique for socializing the risk of making a profit.
648 The truck, although currently used in an uneconomic operation, is a sym-
[493] bol of power in the struggle for a position in the regional markets and in
the intracommunity factional strifes. The usual patron-client system is
being reversed as the Indian puts the Ladino on his payroll to secure eva-
sion from the law. In the changes which are occuring, the defensive struc-
ture of the corporate community is a means by which the Indians are en-
tering into national life not on the lowest rung of the social ladder, but on
terms they are setting for themselves. In the new enterprises, the Indians
combine old ploys with new strategies. Confronted with legal threats from
the outside world, they play the colonial game of defensive ignorance.

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When this fails, they turn to the professional help of lawyers rather than to the old caciques with whom they had formerly maintained patron-client relations. The traditional structural alignment of upper and lower barrios is retained as the basis for organizing the growing cattle herds, but the cooperative provides flexibility and power for developing new enterprises.

The minimal changes in the material environment and the technology of the peasantry are countered by the development of social resources which should facilitate Indian integration in the wider society. In operating the new enterprises independently of Ladino control, they are developing entrepreneurial skills and an awareness of the relationship between capital and profit. The restriction of their operations to nonproductive use of capital for profit, such as buying crops at harvest and reselling as the price rises, reveals the limited dynamics of intracommunal development. The town will look to the regional and national networks for fundamental changes in its economy.

The fear of exciting envy acts as a brake on productive activity and the enjoyment of improved consumption resulting from wealth. Santos' death is a symbolic warning to others who would follow in his footsteps. An earlier case occurred when the ejido land grants were made in the 30s:

The brothers Ča?iletik became "very rich" as a result of careful operation of their ejido and privately owned land. They owned ten pair of oxen and about fifty horses. When they brought in their crops on horseback, it looked like a line of ants. They built a good house in Alkob', and a good threshing shelter. The people of the town began to talk about getting them off the land. The ejido commissioner took their land away and turned it over to others in the town. Until this day, the brothers Ča?iletik are without land. Now they do no more than work like other men. They live poorly. All their cattle and horses are sold.

The organization of the cooperatives is one means of diverting envy directed against individuals and permitting some increase in productive efforts, but the society still lacks the means of validating higher consumption standards. The richest man in town eats better than his neighbors,

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port. At his death, he had no successor, and "the town remained in peace."

In this first political contest, the conflict was interpreted as opposition between the dual divisions. Factional disputes and the sense of political responsibility and control were contained within these parameters, and any conflict was conceived of as a threat to territorial balancing mechanisms.

The new factions that have developed since 1963 are tied to economic rather than territorial competition. In 1960 the first truck-owning cooperative was organized under the leadership of the former Ladino secretary. The twenty shareholders of the town had only a small amount of capital in the truck, and the controlling interest was in the hands of the secretary's wife. The cooperative was merely a device to gain business in carrying pottery and wheat from the town to the market centers. In 1963 a new truck-owning cooperative was organized by local Indians. The two brothers, Santiago and José, secured capital to buy the truck from thirty residents of the town without any assistance from outside. The shareholders of the new cooperative came from both sides of the dual division, and from the outlying barrios.

When the leaders of the new cooperative tried to get permits and certificates to license the car and the operator, they were refused by the town president who was a shareholder of the first cooperative. The Indians then hired a Ladino truck driver from the neighboring town, and the son of one of the shareholders served as assistant. They realized that it was necessary to get control of the local political positions in order to extend their operations. With the help of the schoolteacher, they got eighty-one signatures on the petition for the PRI candicacy of one of the brothers, José, in the presidential nomination of 1964. He was opposed by a ladinoized Indian living in one of the barrios who was backed by the Ladino secretary who was leader of the competing trucking cooperative. The opponent did not have a chance of winning, as the leaders of the new cooperative pointed out, because of two strikes against him: he was not a resident of the center and he had only PAN backing. The Indians are aware that nothing can be gained politically by a PAN-backed president since PRI is now the party in control of regional and national offices.

After José's election, the Indian truck driver was able to get a driving license. With the help of the schoolmaster, the cooperative was able to get

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permission to extend operations to hot country where the Indians of the town held ejido land. This territory had been controlled by the state-wide trucking sindicate whose monopoly was protected by government permits. On the basis that they were poor, nonprofit-making ejidatarios, the Indians were granted the right to truck corn from the ejido colonies to the highlands. Whenever the cooperative leaders planned to go to the departmental capital to make their appeals, the schoolmaster counseled them to wear their Indian čostume—the white shirt and pants with red sash, sandals, and woolen kotonču—in order to play the role of simple campesinos more convincingly. He was aware of the effectiveness of this pose in pro-Indian governmental circles.

The PRI leadership in the department capital is neither aware of nor interested in the local factions which seek their support. Their concern is only that the vote is solidly behind regional and national candidates of the party, and they support the group that can mobilize the largest number of votes. A policy of favoritism toward Indians, based on an ideology of *indigenismo,* pro-Indianism, is coupled with a policy of permitting local autonomy. The national committee's program for promoting literacy has never reached this community nor any that I know of in the area. The party's promotion of Indian welfare consists of supporting demands made by Indian constituents and bringing them to the attention of civil service officials assigned to these functions. Party officials thus act as intermediaries between the voters and the bureaucracy of the government, channeling complaints and demands.

In the development of factions around new economic interests, the Indians have shifted from an ideology in which the dialectic of conflict was cast in traditional dual-division opposition to one in which the conflict is seen as Indian versus Ladino domination of enterprises. Since these interests cut across the territorial divisions, the economic factions have not crystallized along territorial lines. It is this shift in perspective which makes for the "qualitative" change in local political organization.

Competition between Caciques

There are several dimensions to the role of cacique in Tzoʔontahal. First, it is a role created by outside interests and occupied by someone mar-

partners. He sold a few shares of a truck he and his family owned to Indians, but he retained the controlling interest. His wife was reputed to be a witch, and was an active curer, combining old and new treatments of illnesses.

His position was challenged in the 1960s by the Ladino schoolmaster, who had been remarkably unsuccessful from his arrival in 1953 until that time in gaining personal power and influence. His intercession in a local homicide case involving a father's murder of his son outraged the townspeople, some of whom threatened to kill him. His attempts to have water installed aroused the curers against him since they were accustomed to bathing their patients at the source of the spring from which they were debarred when the plumbing was installed. His demands that children within the legal age limit should not only attend school but should be prohibited from marrying until they had completed their schooling caused the anger of parents who wanted to give their daughters in an early and profitable marriage.

Gradually, however, the schoolmaster extended his own base of support. He minimized his attack on local customs, adhering only to those laws affecting the school population, over which he had a great deal of control. Some of his support came from the orthodox Catholic members of the community; he extended his control through compadre relationships with over eighty members of the community. He showed movies which he acquired from the United Nations and other educational film sources and gave away medicines acquired from the health officials in the state capitol who were his friends. From one of these sources of philanthropy he acquired wool shawls which he gave to every woman in the town.

The professor demanded no return from the townspeople other than their respect and admiration; he was a person who enjoyed commanding others and needed an arena in which to project his own personality. In his early years in the town, he had to satisfy this need by capturing stray tourists and plying them with soda pop or coffee. His first opportunity to gain leadership in the local sphere came in 1963, when he supported the new truck-owning cooperative. He used the influence of contacts in the state capital, including compadres, friends, and relatives of his wife's family. He promoted the cooperative's attempt to gain the presidency. One of the first

been made, there is no recourse but to kill the man since he may retaliate by killing his accuser (this occurred in two of the cases noted in Table 29).

Conflict between generations in the role sets father/son and father/son-in-law stems from delay in carrying out role responsibilities. Fathers are expected to provide the money for the costs of betrothal, and to give their children shares of the patrimony including both land and livestock. The scheduling of when this should occur is often a matter of dispute, resulting in at least two cases of homicide in the period analyzed.

New economic enterprises have exacerbated the tensions rising from envy. Foster (1965) has suggested that envy stems from the notion of the "limited good," requiring the strategy of a "zero sum game" (Bennet 1966). The fact that the new wealth is evidence of new opportunities, not a subtraction from a given resource supply, has not entered the cognitive awareness of the people. The prospering leaders of these enterprises feel themselves to be particularly vulnerable to the envy of others and thus to the charge of witchcraft. There have been several open attacks on new leaders accused as witches; the leader of the truck cooperative, for example, was murdered in 1966. Six men have been killed as cattle thieves in the past ten years.

The economic roles created with the introduction of new enterprises have not been integrated in the traditional pattern of recruitment and control. In the association of cattle breeders, leadership tends to be based on the size of the herd; in the case of the truck cooperative, amount of capital invested and entrepreneurial skills have determined the leadership of the enterprise, while driving skill and ability to get along in the Ladino world has been the basis for choice of drivers. Such achievement principles as the basis for recruitment into these envied positions are not accepted in the same way that age and passage through a hierarchy of posts validated higher positions in the old hierarchies. The conspicuous expenditure of wealth in the more expensive posts in the religious hierarchy has also failed to lessen hostility aroused by the increasing disparity in wealth, and in fact those who have served as alférez have been even more subject to witchcraft aroused by envy.

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and adaptive responses. With the expansion of cattle raising, Indians have organized associations adjusted to the traditional dual division. The association for each side of the dual division mobilizes labor for maintaining the watering holes. The failure to organize communal corrals means that inefficient herding techniques, damage to the milpa, and frequent loss or theft of cattle persist. The association reacts to the last problem by hiring killers to get rid of those suspected of theft, but this adaptive response is limited to dealing with particular incidents and has not solved the problem.

The manufacturers of contraband liquor have succeeded in organizing a syndicate strong enough to maintain a monopoly price for both the internal and external markets and to provide security for themselves against federal agents. The syndicate mobilizes for specific actions, such as raising the bail bond for imprisoned members or punishing informers. As a community-wide organization ignoring the dual division and age-ranked seniority, it represents an adaptation in response to extra-community pressures.

The cooperatives that have been organized to manage the local store and the trucks provide permanent managerial operations that are an adaptation to growing interaction in extra-community economic activities. Cooperative owners are able to raise the capital to maintain and expand these operations. It is within these structures that entrepreneurial skills are being developed. The organizers gain the advantage not only of socializing the risk of loss but also of making a profit in a community where belief in witchcraft, fostered by envy, is rampant.

Activities in the new economic enterprises are not supported by any supernatural belief. In order to gain acceptance for the new enterprises, the entrepreneur Santos, who had organized the trucking cooperative, recognized the need for an ideology. His rhetoric drew upon the sense of deprivation Indians feel in their relations with Ladinos. He justified his own ends as an attempt to gain for all the community the profits that only Ladinos had been able to gain through trucking and crops resales in the regional markets. The ideology he had begun to formulate stressed economic and political independence from both the Ladino entrepreneurs of neighboring towns and government agents who tried to promote welfare

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programs in the interest of "civilizing" the Indians. This formulation involved a basic contradiction between the goal of moving into regional and national networks and that of keeping the old autonomy and independence of the corporate community. He never had to face that contradiction. Unable to gain adherents other than the small group of profit-sharers in the cooperative he organized, he was killed by opponents within the community.

The Family and Household

The core of the traditional culture lay in the local power hierarchies patterned on the familial model of age-ordered paternal authority institutionalized in the me?iltatil. The me?iltatil of the household have provided a flexible institution for adjusting conflict within the kin group. Their role in directing ritual performances preserves a sense of continuity in life cycle changes.

The institutionalized authority of the elders has not been upset by the trend toward residence based on nuclear families, which is an adjustment to the pressure of limited space in the town center. Kinship ties are continually reinforced by rituals that draw together the me?iltalil as sponsors of ceremonies marking baptism, marriage, and death. This group of sponsoring relatives has absorbed the institution of compadrazgo, adding compadres to the network of affinally-and bilaterally-related kin. The procedures for adjusting conflict among members of the household and extended family networks reinforce the authority of the elders. When adjustive processes in the house and court "arrangements" and in curing ceremonies fail, the only recourse is for one of the disputants to leave the community or commit homicide.

Ceremonies within the household provide a model for the rules of the game that apply to adjustive behavior in the community. The household officials introduce new officials into their role, teaching them the prayers and directing the proceedings. Their authority depends upon age and prestige acquired in office. The me?iltatil, as the elders of the family, are the direct link with the ancestors. They and the nakawane provide the strongest force for preserving the ways of the ancestors.

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621 578 177 178 [114] [474] [182] was channeled along existing lines of competition. During my stay in the community from 1964 to 1966, most conflicts were attributed to economic competition between the two trucking cooperatives. Along with this, the waning of the position of the principales has undermined the confidence of the people in the system of checks and balances in which the principales watched over the judges, the judges watched over the curers, the curers watched over the people to see that no one brought in evil, and the ancestors watched over everyone. Curers are more and more often accused of [756] witchcraft and are frequent victims of homicide. The sense that they are the guardians of the pueblo and the agents of the ancestors is nearly dead. They are consulted only because the people feel that, because of the evil in them, they can fight the evil caused by others.

621 756 177 178 The shift in power from the old leaders to the new has not been accompanied by a shift in ideological allegiance. The new leaders cannot offer the security the people felt when they were living in the eyes of the ancestors. The curers remain as a powerful group because of their claims of being able to fight evil, but there is no longer a legitimate authority controlling their use of destructive forces.

561 554 177 178 A system of authority based on rule by elders is a structural correlative of a behavior pattern in which people act out the ways of the ancestors. This applies to the schematized behavior contained in rituals and in traditional productive activities. The ideology of a seniority-based prestige system persists at the explicit level at the same time that behavioral changes in contradiction to this are occurring.

626 177 178 Social control in a system of behavior based on what was done in the past depends upon the belief that people are carrying out their lives "in the eyes of the ancestors." Ritual behavior in Tzo?ontahal seems to confirm this, but in view of the waning belief in the presence of the ancestors and the loss of confidence in their agents, the curers, this behavior is a kind of social lie designed to perpetuate the old code of morality. In their everyday behavior, people no longer act on the same premises. The social lie is perpetuated because the people who enjoyed power in the old social system—the curers and the elders—do not wish to relinquish it. It will last only so long as they can find successors, and with the abolition of the recruitment through alfereces, this should not be for long.

M 563 621 647 T 621 743 647

doctors and officers of the National Indian Institute (INI) who arrive to the villages at irregular intervals. In Amatenango, the INI has established a "clinic" in which a native nurse provides some medical services, such as vaccinations, the selling of aspirin, etc., while in Aguacatenango the native INI nurse provides services in his home.

T 621 647 474

In both the villages the INI has established a cooperative store which sells staples which are not produced in the community, but such stores are in no sense agents of cultural change, selling only commodities which the Indians habitually buy elsewhere. (A reason for the lack of success of such stores is that the Indians have not understood the "cooperative" principle, very few men have joined, and they are disillusioned with the marginal profit obtained through them.) In 1958, Amatenango had water piped into the village, a project completed by the INI in 1957; while after the author left Aguacatenango in 1958, water pipes were installed there.

T 621 647 312 114

M 563 692

Political relations with the Ladinos of a more formal nature occur through the courts of justice and national government offices, and they are characterized by the covert (and at times open) hostility and misunderstanding on the part of both Indians and Ladinos (see D. Metzger, 1956 and Fuente, Julio de la, 1958).

T 628 438 571 608 582

Relations with other Indian villages are common both for Amatenango and Aguacatenango. They trade with the communities located in different ecological zones the products that do not grow in their territory (ocote from the highlands, sugar cane from the lowlands, etc.) in exchange for their own products and they

these apparently irrelevant comments reveal the power play going on behind the scene of the ritual.

The observed schedule for the civil inauguration (App. 1, column 4) differed from the elicited in four details. The first of these was an item omitted by both informants: after liquor was served in the house of the president, the entire company stood up and "turned toward the wall" (App. 1, Q. 20). When I questioned my informant, he corrected the orientation "toward the-wall" and said that they were turning toward the east in deference to the leader of all the saints of the east, led by Santo Aṭio. He said that it was done in all household celebrations in order "to be sure that the devil does not enter." Belief concerning these saints is fragmentary, and perhaps because of this, behavior relating to them is not easily recalled. These behavioral sherds, when cut off from the belief system they once dramatized, survive in "perpetuating the custom of the ancestors" *(hič sluwar hič likem me?tiktatik)*.

Another detail not mentioned by informants was the presence in the house of the president of the rural colonia inhabitants (Chart 6). This omission is typical of the neglect in reporting the activity or presence of anyone other than residents of the center. When I asked what they were doing there, I was told they came "to know the president."

Finally, an important divergence from expected behavior occurred when the schoolteacher, instead of the secretary, delivered the oath of office. This change was evidence of the schoolteacher's success in a factional struggle developing around new economic enterprises in the town. The former Ladino secretary was in close alliance with the former president and had supporters in the group of 20 co-owners, Indians from the village, of the truck when he had purchased. When the incoming president with his brother bought a truck with the assistance of 30 members of a truck-owning cooperative, a new focus for factional strife appeared in the town. The new cooperative was supported by the schoolteacher in his own bid for power. When the truck owners ran into any difficulty with the highway patrol, carrying wood or passengers without permit, the driver would refer them to the schoolteacher, who would then claim it

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was done at his order for the school.[11] The new co-operative was harassed by the old group, since the president did everything in his power to cut down their competition. As fiscal, his other role, he maneuvered the appointment of the chief business agent of the new truck cooperative and three other members as *nič'anil martomaetik*, junior caretakers of the saints. This meant that their Sundays were occupied in church affairs and cut into their taxiing of passengers from Tzo?ontahal to Himšol, the neighboring Ladino town.

The nomination of the president was effected by winning the support of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Supporters of the nominee secured over 85 signatures from townspeople; the opposition candidate failed to get more than 28. Once PRI support was obtained, the election on November 20 was assured since one-party rule prevails here as in the capital. This is the first election which has been contested in 10 years. The last contest came when some members of the barrio of Yut' hok became members of the minor party, Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Because this group and their presidential candidate all came from one side of the dual division, Alannantik, those from the other side said that they should have a party representative. They drew up a plan to run a candidate on PRI. The PAN candidate won. The present contest was drawn on the basis of membership in the truck-owning cooperatives which cut across the dual division.

The present nominee did not want to run for office. Early in the running there were verbal threats on his life. He had never passed in any office other than that of president of the ejido commission, and although the office of president is not a rung in the ladder to office, it is expected that the incumbent would at least have experience as síndico. Three sources of opposition to his candidacy developed. First in importance was the original trucking cooperative, which objected to the competition of the president and his faction in the new cooperative. Second, these members spread the rumor that the new president would bring in federal agents to break up the liquor traffic, which was becoming one of Tzo?ontahal's most important economic self-development projects. Thus all the distillers were apprehensive of their future under his term of office. Third, there was opposition on the

[11] Siverts (1964) describes Ladinos' "competition for each others' Indians in Cancuc."

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